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Abstract 
Wage differentials between mothers and childless women are estimated correcting for the 
selectivity bias resulting from two double selection processes: firstly, the motherhood 
decision and the employment decision, and secondly the motherhood decision and the 
decision to be employed in a less demanding job. We use Dutch data on women’s wages and 
construct an indicator for less demanding jobs. Our estimations indicate that the motherhood 
decision is strongly correlated with both employment and having a less demanding job. This 
suggests that ignoring these correlations will lead to inconsistent parameter estimations of 
wage equations. The selectivity corrected estimation of women’s wage differentials indicate 
that a large part of the wage differential is composed by discrimination compared to 
estimations without correction for selectivity  
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1 Introduction  
An increasing number of studies analyses labour market consequences of motherhood while 
the participation rate of (married) women, in particular mothers, increases in advanced 
countries. The tenor of these studies is whether working mothers experience wage penalties 
compared to childless women, called child gap in pay. Studies conducted in various countries 
exhibit a wide variation in child gap, which is motivated by both differences in institutional 
arrangements across countries and estimation strategies. A frequently mentioned issue in the 
literature is the selectivity problem that may lead to inconsistent estimations. The selectivity 
problem may occur when working mothers are not a random sample of the potential female 
population having children or when job-choices of mothers are not a random process.  
Some of these studies estimate wage differentials correcting for selection into employment, 
and indicate that the selection problem does not necessarily occur for every country (Harkness 
and Waldfogel forthcoming, Datta Gupta and Smith 2002, Joshi et al 1999, Waldfogel 1994, 
Waldfogel 1995)2. For the Netherlands, no study on a possible child gap has been conducted.  
This paper examines wage differentials between childless women and mothers in the Dutch 
labour market in 2001 focussing on double selectivity with respect to two main underlying 
decision processes: the decision to have a child and the decision to have a paid job 
considering segregation into less and more demanded jobs. Since having a child can be 
postponed and its timing can be (easily) manipulated due to developments in medical 
technology, women’s decision to have a child and its timing are possibly related to their 
participation decision in the labour market. In addition, the job choices of women are strongly 
influenced by numerous factors associated with the role of women in the household, 
alternative household help opportunities and childcare facilities. It is considered not to be 
unrealistic that women are tended to choose certain types of jobs that are easy to combine 
with other family activities but provide a poor prospect in terms of wage and job promotion 
(Gronau 1988). To deal with this problem, we identify less demanding jobs by factor analysis, 
and model the double selection into having a child and the choice for being employed in a less 
demanding job explicitly.  
We discuss the decision of motherhood in relation to paid-employment and motivate our 
methodology to measure the child gap in section 2. In section 3 we model two alternative 
double selection models from which selectivity coefficients are obtained. Furthermore we 
decompose wage differentials. Section 4 describes the datasets employed in this study. In 
section 5, we develop a bivariate indicator for less demanding jobs. The indicator makes use 
of several characteristics of the job such as working hours, type of contract, managerial tasks, 
possibility to do part of the job at home, job requiring additional training, overtime and 
commuting. Sections 6 presents and interprets the empirical results. The paper ends with a 
conclusion in section 7. 
2  Background 
After the seminal works of Heckman and Lee in the late 1970s, there is an increasing 
awareness about the selectivity bias that may occur if the participating women are not a 
random sub-sample of the original sample. Consistently, many studies correct wage 
estimations for the selectivity bias applying the original Heckman-Lee two-step procedure 
assuming that the wage sample results from a single censoring process: obtaining a selectivity 
coefficient (lambda) by estimating a univariate probit and including this selectivity variable in 
                                                     
2 See Wetzels 2002 for a review on the family gap in pay. Gupta and Smith 2001 did find a selection effect for Denmark. 
Harkness & Waldfogel (1999) found a significant selectivity bias for the United States, and not for the other 6 industrialised 
countries in their analyses. Selection bias was not found by Waldfogel (1994, 1995). Albrecht et al 1999 did not correct for 
sample selection. 
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OLS wage regressions. However, if wages are determined by two underlying decision 
processes, the sample selectivity problem remains unsolved. In case of multiple decision rules 
that are correlated to each other, a joint estimation of these decision functions generates 
asymptotically more efficient estimators (Meng and Schmidt 1985; Tunali 1986). 
Consistently, the single selection rule was extended to double selection rule by later studies 
that model two underlying decision processes in a bivariate framework (Poirier 1979; Van de 
Ven and Van Praag 1981; Fishe et al. 1981; Abowd and Farber 1982, Tunali 1986). In 
particular, Fishe et al. (1981) extend this two step procedure by modelling a joint decision 
process for women: the participation decision and the decision to attend college while 
Sorensen (1989) analyses wage differentials between typically female occupations and other 
occupations considering women’s participation decision and their occupation choice in a 
sequential framework. However, studies that have focussed on the child gap or wages of 
mothers failed to control for women’s decision whether or not to have a child and for their job 
choices. These studies implicitly assume that women, who become a mother, make their 
decision randomly, unrelated to any kind of labour market related issues. Women’s 
employment decision is likely determined with shadow wages that are in turn determined by 
family structure, childcare facilities, supply of suitable jobs and own subjective preferences. 
Additionally, medical developments crucially allow the planning of maternity as well as 
childlessness. Such a random-motherhood assumption is unlikely to be true when we closely 
look at some demographic developments in the last 20 to 30 years.  
Table 1 indicates that mothers have postponed the timing of children a couple of years, 
especially the timing of first birth. The percentage of mothers who are below 30 years has 
decreased from 53.7% to 37.4% in favour of mothers older than 30 years within one decade 
(1990 to 2000). Average age of women giving first birth has increased almost two years from 
27.5 in 1990 to 29.2 in 20013. Additionally, the estimated proportion of women remaining 
childless sharply increases4 for the successive birth cohorts from 14.7% in 1950 to 19.5% in 
1958, as shown in the panel b of Table 1 although in the Netherlands fertility rates show a 
quite stable pattern between 1990 en 2001, around 1.6.  
(Delayed) maternity and voluntary ultimate childlessness are likely related to the view on 
mother’s role in society and correspondingly government policies with respect to the 
combination of paid work and motherhood, since women’s childbearing behavior strongly 
differs across countries5. This view differs historically between clusters of welfare states 
according to the typology of Esping-Andersen (1990), and according to the breadwinner 
thought in social policies (Sainsbury 1996). We characterize the Dutch welfare state till 1990 
as coming close to the Christian democratic welfare state with policies designed in order to 
induce women to work in the home fulltime caring for young children. 6 However from 1990 
social policies in the Netherlands have changed into facilitating the combination of work and 
family, which fits the social democratic model. 7 
 
                                                     
3 The mean age at maternity in the Netherlands started to increase in the 1970s from 24.3 years in 1970. The increase slows down 
as age at maternity remains 29.1 years between 1998 and 2001. (Statistics Netherlands 1994, 2002). The contribution of women 
who are 30 years of age or older to the period total fertility rate is 51.5 per cent in 1992. 
4 Kohler and Ortega (2002) suggest that childlessness in cohorts who have not yet completed childbearing as of the late 1990s 
will stabilize between 15-20% basing on the level of fertility observed during the 1990s.  
5 For example: the age at maternity in the United States is 24.7 in 2000 (United States’ National Center for Health Statistics 
(www.cdc.gov-nchs-data-statatab.tab1). 
6 In 1965 only 7% of married women participated in the labour market. Women’s participation rate (excluding jobs of less than 
12 hours per week) has increased from 41% in 1988 to 54% in 1999. 
The Childcare Stimulation Act of 1990 is the first government action which explicitly caters to the needs of the working mother rather 
than assigning priority to educational considerations for children.  In international comparison leave arrangements to combine work and 
children are still limited. In 1990 maternity leave was extended to 16 weeks and each parent became eligible to an additional parental 
leave of 6 months. However as many as 90 percent of all employees are covered by a coolective labour agreement without payment of 
parental leave. Only the (CAO of the) public sector offers 75 percent of earnings. See Wetzels 2001. 
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Table 1: Postponement of Giving Birth & Childlessness in the Netherlands  
(a) Postponement: The distribution of mothers’ age at giving birth in the Netherlands, in 
percentages:  
Age group 1990 2000
35 years or older 11.7 20.3
30-34 years 34.8 42.2
25-29 years 38.9 27.8
Younger than 25 years 14.8 9.6
             of which younger than 20 1.7 1.2
 
Mean age at giving first birth 27.5 29.1
Calculated on CBS 2002  
(b) Childlessness 
 
Source: Bosveld (1996) 
 
In the 1990s, the specific public policies have been designed to increase the participation rate 
of (married) women by abolishing disadvantages of non-standard work in terms of lower 
wages, poor pension prospects etc. Specifically, it is legally determined that the social and 
economic rights of part-time work is equal to these rights of full-time work,8 although more 
indirect negative effects of non-standard jobs on career prospects remain. Social policies aim 
to keep women in the labour market (in long part time jobs 28 hours and more) by 
encouraging fathers to share the care of children. Fathers are legally supported to adjust their 
working hours to care-intensivity of children needed. These changes in policies have led to 
more opportunities for mothers in the labour market while women’s childbearing behaviour 
has been liberated from traditional forces predetermining women’s role in society. Moreover, 
technical developments have made postponement and prevention possible. In this context 
motherhood and employment decisions are likely correlated. Consequently, we need to model 
this correlation explicitly.  
2.1 Are mothers disadvantaged? 
Leading question is whether mothers still have a relatively low wage rate after the correction 
for the duration of timeout due to birth, which can be interpreted as a stagnation or 
depreciation in human capital endowment relative to other female workers without children. 
We start to analyse this so-called child gap by estimation of wage regressions for all women 
in the sample including a child dummy in regressions. Appendix Table A1 shows the 
                                                     
8 Beyond this the transfer from part time to fulltime and reverse has been in the center of the debate. The 1997 European Union 
Directive on Part-time Work states: “employers should give consideration to requests by workers to transfer from full-time to 
part-time work and the reverse when such work becomes available.”  The Netherlands has gone much farther than demanding 
that employers should “give consideration” to employees who wish to transfer between full-time and part-time work. The Act on 
Adjustment of Working Hours (Wet Aanpassing Arbeidsduur), which went into effect July 1, 2000, gives those employed by 
firms with more than 10 employees the right to shorten or increase work hours on request if they have been employed for at least 
one year, and have not asked for a change in working hours within the past two years. Within four months prior to changing work 
hours, the employee should indicate the date that the new working hours take effect, the number of working hours, and the 
preferred distribution of working hours during the week. The employer should, in principle, agree to the request and is obliged to 
indicate any reason for disagreement. The hourly wage remains the same.  
Proportion of childless women in 1990 The estimated proportion being ultimately childless in 1992 
Age group Per cent Birth cohort Per cent 
25-29 years 61.4 1950 14.7 
30-34 years 30.3 1955 17.8 
35-39 years. 18.6 1958 19.5 
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alternative estimates of wage regressions. Firstly, we estimate wage regression by using only 
human capital covariates measured by calendar years and a child dummy (the upper part of 
table A1). The estimate indicates a significant child gap, Kid, 8.7 percent. If age is used in 
place of experience, this gap is even 9.3 percent. When this last model is extended, the child 
gap may be 6.7 percent at 10 percent significance level. On the other hand, the extended 
model with experience in calendar years generates insignificant coefficients for child gap. If 
age and experience variables are included at the same time, the child gap coefficient becomes 
smaller and insignificant. Finally, we calculate the full-time equivalent of experience, 
Expfteq, and include this and its quadratic form in the basic regression and extended 
regression, the child gap disappears convincingly in both cases. These results suggest that 
there would be no child gap in the Netherlands when we correct women’s wage function for 
differences in human capital of childless women and mothers.9 Our results also suggest that 
the number of hours worked is more important in raising human capital accumulation than the 
continuity of employment in the form of fewer hours distributed over time. On the other hand, 
the connection with labour market with small jobs may increase employment probability, 
which we do not verify in this paper. However, the absence of child gap is hard to believe 
because of sample selectivity, which we investigate in next section. 
3 Empirical models with double sample selection 
Career oriented mothers are expected to be more likely in employment compared with less-
career oriented women. Therefore, the sample of employed mothers is expected to be biased 
upward. We also expect that employed mothers are more concentrated in less demanding jobs 
(see section 5 for the definition). This suggests that the sample of women employed in less 
demanding jobs is expected to be biased upward. In order to deal with these sample selection 
problems, we explicitly model underlying decision process of the motherhood and 
employment applying a bivariate probit model (Heckman 1979; Poirier 1979; Van de Ven and 
Van Praag 1981; Abowd and Farber 1982, Maddala 1983, Tunali 1986)). Firstly, we consider 
that the motherhood decision and the employment decision are simultaneously determined. 
Alternatively, motherhood and employment types, i.e. (less) demanding jobs are assumed to 
be jointly determined in a double selection framework (see Section 5 for the definition of less 
demanding job). These pairs of decision rules may be presented in a single standard bivariate 
probit model. 
3.1 Simultaneous Decisions  
We wish to correct our wage estimations for selectivity bias resulting from two alternative 
double selection processes: the motherhood decision and the employment decision on the one 
hand, and the motherhood decision and the type of job decision (the less demanding job 
decision) on the other hand. In the first model women simultaneously decide whether or not 
having a child and being employed. In the second model women simultaneously decide 
whether or not having a child and being employed in a less demanding job. The simultaneous 
double selection process is ill10ustrated by Figure 1  
                                                     
9 See for an overview of the European literature Wetzels 2002. There is no other study analysing data on the Netherlands that 
uses actual experience in the labour market.  
10 In order to avoid repetition we illustrate both models in one Figure, since 1iy  is the same in both models. However 2iy  in 
model 1 denotes whether a woman is employed or not while 2iy  in model 2 denotes whether a women is employed in a less 
demanding job or employed in a demanding job.  
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Where 1iy  and 2iy  take a one when a woman is mother and is employed (in a less demanding 
job) respectively, and 1iy  and 2iy  take a zero when a woman is not employed (is employed in 
a demanding job) and is childless. The decisions may be written as reduced form equations  
 
*
1 1 1 1i i iy x β ε= +       (1) 
*
2 2 2 2i i iy x β ε= +       (2) 
where *1iy  denotes the preference function of a woman which is measured by the difference 
between the woman’s expected benefit from motherhood and opportunity costs of 
motherhood. The woman becomes a mother if the expected benefit of motherhood exceeds 
the opportunity costs ( )*1 0iy > . The *2iy  is the difference between the woman’s expected 
market wage and reservation wage when employment is considered. It is the difference 
between the expected benefit in demanding and less demanding jobs when employment type 
is considered. If the market wage is higher than the reservation wage, the woman will 
participate in paid-employment ( )*2 0iy > . Alternatively, if the expected benefit in less 
demanding jobs is higher than the expected benefit in demanding jobs, the woman will 
participate in less demanding job.  In equations (1) and (2), 1ix  and 2ix denote a vector of 
characteristics that affect motherhood and employment decisions, 1β  and 2β  are the 
corresponding coefficients, and 1iε and 2iε  are disturbance terms that are assumed to follow a 
bivariate standard normal distribution [ ] [ ]1 2 0i iE Eε ε= = , [ ] [ ]1 2 1i iVar Varε ε= =  and the 
disturbance terms in the two equations are correlated: [ ]1 2,i iCov ε ε ρ= . 
The dependent variables *1iy and 
*
2iy are unobserved latent variables. We observe only a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether or not a woman is a mother ( 1iy ) and whether or not 
a woman is employed ( 2iy ).  
*
1 11 if 0
   0,  otherwise
i iy y= >
=         (3) 
*
2 21 if 0
   0,  otherwise
i iy y= >
=       (4) 
The log likelihood function is given by (Greene, 1997, p907-908) 
( ) ( )( )*2 1 1 1 2 2 2
1
ln ln , ,
n
i i i i i
i
L q x q xβ β ρ
=
= Φ∑    (5) 
where  ( )2Φ  is the cumulative normal bivariate distribution function, 
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1
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1 if 0
1 otherwise
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2
1 if 0
1 otherwise
i
i
y
q
≠= −  and  
*
1 2i i iq qρ ρ=  
 
3.2 Selectivity corrected wage equations 
The bivariate probit models have four decision combinations represented by two dichotomous 
variables in each model. The possible outcomes of the selection processes are given in Figure 
3 for both model where Sj denotes the set of individuals falling into the jth subsample: 
j=1,2,3,4. In the left hand-side table, S1 represents the state that a woman has given birth to at 
least one child and is employed, S2 gives the state that a women is childless and employed, S3 
represents the state that a mother is not employed and S4 shows the state that a childless 
woman is not employed. Identically, the right-hand side table gives decision combinations 
between motherhood and less demanding job. 
 
Figure 3. Possible outcomes of the selection processes 
  Figure 3a     Figure 3b 
  Motherhood ( 1iy )  Motherhood ( 1iy ) 
  1 0   1 0 
1 S1 S2 1 S1 S2 Employment 
( 2iy ) 0 S3 S4 
 
Less demanding 
job ( Liy ) 0 S3 S4 
 
 
The probabilities of these sub-samples can be formally written as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
* *
1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2
2 1 2
Pr 1, 1 Pr 0, 0 Pr ,
                                  , ;
i i i i i iS y y y y C C
C C
ε ε
ρ
= = = = > > = > − > −
= Φ  (6) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
* *
2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2
2 1 2
Pr 1, 0 Pr 0, 0 Pr ,
                                  , ;
i i i i i iS y y y y C C
C C
ε ε
ρ
= = = = > ≤ = > − ≤ −
= Φ − −  (7) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
* *
3 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2
2 1 2
Pr 0, 1 Pr 0, 0 Pr ,
                                  , ;
i i i i i iS y y y y C C
C C
ε ε
ρ
= = = = ≤ > = ≤ − > −
= Φ − −  (8) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
* *
4 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2
2 1 2
Pr 0, 0 Pr 0, 0 Pr ,
                                  , ;
i i i i i iS y y y y C C
C C
ε ε
ρ
= = = = ≤ ≤ = ≤ − ≤ −
= Φ − −   (9) 
where ,  1,2t ti tC x tβ= =  These probabilities will determine the structure of earnings 
equations. In case of non-employment, wages of women in S3 and S4 are not observed 
because they are not employed. In case of employment types, Liy in Figure 3, all four cells are 
observed. 
Since wages are observed only for employed labour, the conventional earnings functions for 
mothers and childless women have the form  
9 
 
 
1 1 1 1 1ln   i i wiw z iff i Sψ ε= + ∈       (10) 
2 2 2 2 2ln   i i wiw z iff i Sψ ε= + ∈       (11) 
when less demanding jobs are considered, wages are also observed for the other two cells, S3 
and S4  
3 3 3 3 3ln   i i wiw z iff i Sψ ε= + ∈       (12) 
4 4 4 4 4ln   i i wiw z iff i Sψ ε= + ∈       (13) 
 
where ln iw denotes the natural logarithm of ith worker’s wage, iz denotes of the vector of 
exogenous variables that explain the worker’s wage, iψ  and wiε  denotes the normally 
distributed disturbance term with zero mean, ( ) 0wiE ε =  and ( ) 2wi wVar ε σ= .  However, the 
expected value of the disturbance term is not necessarily zero if there is a selectivity bias due 
to relevant explanatory variables that are not available in the data (omitted variable bias) or 
due to individual self-selection. In this case, ordinary least squares estimates will generate 
inconsistent parameter estimates (Lee 1978; Heckman 1979).  Following Heckman’s 
procedure, these earnings equations derived as follows      
 
( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 1ln i i wiE w i S z E i Sψ δ ε∈ = + ∈     (14) 
( ) ( )2 2 2 2 2 2ln i i wiE w i S z E i Sψ δ ε∈ = + ∈     (15) 
( ) ( )3 3 3 3 3 3ln i i wiE w i S z E i Sψ δ ε∈ = + ∈     (16) 
( ) ( )4 4 4 4 2 4ln i i wiE w i S z E i Sψ δ ε∈ = + ∈     (17) 
 
Thus, the Heckman procedure suggests that the two selectivity variables should be included in 
earnings equation to correct for selectivity bias (Tunali 1985).  
1 1 1 1 11 1 12 1ln i i i i iw z uψ α λ δ λ= + + +      (18) 
2 2 2 2 21 2 22 2ln i i i i iw z uψ α λ δ λ= + + +       (19) 
3 3 3 3 31 3 32 3ln i i i i iw z uψ α λ δ λ= + + +      (20) 
4 4 4 4 41 4 42 4ln i i i i iw z uψ δ λ δ λ= + + +      (21) 
 
where  1δ  and kδ denotes  the coefficients of selectivity variables 1iλ and 1iλ  that are defined 
as  
( ) ( )1 2
11
1
C M
S
φλ Φ= ; ( ) ( )2 112
1
C M
S
φλ Φ= ; ( ) ( )1 221
2
C M
S
φλ Φ −= ; ( ) ( )2 122
2
C M
S
φλ Φ= −   
( ) ( )1 2
31
3
C M
S
φλ Φ −= − ; ( ) ( )2 132
3
C M
S
φλ Φ −= − ; ( ) ( )1 241
4
C M
S
φλ Φ −= − ; ( ) ( )2 142
4
C M
S
φλ Φ −= −   
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where 1 2
1 21
C CM ρρ
−= −
;  2 1
2 21
C CM ρρ
−= −
 
 
φ  is the univariate standard normal density function, Φ  is the cumulative standard 
normal distribution and 2Φ is the bivariate standard normal distribution function. 
 
3.3 Wage differentials  
Logarithmic wage differentials are decomposed into two main parts, following standard 
Oaxaca & Blinder method (Blinder 1973, Oaxaca 1973). First mean log wage differentials 
between mothers and childless women are decomposed as follows.    
 
( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆln ln  N M N N M M N MW W X X Xβ β β− = − + −    (22) 
where subscripts N and M refer to childless women and mothers respectively, beta-hat’s 
denote estimated coefficients and X-bar’s denote the mean of characteristics. The first term at 
the right hand side measures wage differentials due to worker characteristics, and second term 
measures the unexplained part of wage differentials between childless women and mothers. 
Note that disturbances are not included in the decomposition. 
 
4 Data 
We use the Work & IT 2001 survey, which derives from the computerized Telepanel 
collected by Center Data hosted by Tilburg University. This panel is a representative sample 
of the Dutch population. For our purpose, only women aged 16 to 64 have been selected. Data 
includes rich information on women who are employed and women who are not employed 
and not participating in the labor market. The questionnaire addresses current labor force 
status, actual and contractual hours of work, commuting, 13 questions address characteristics 
of the workplace, and remaining questions address individual and household characteristics. 
More specifically, data have information on actual labor market experience and tenure. Most 
research on Dutch women’s wages lacks this important information. As regards employment 
experience the following questions are posed to persons who indicate that they have been 
engaged in employment: ‘How many years have you been employed (excluding holiday jobs 
and weekend jobs). Please fill out each category that applies to you. If you do not know 
exactly the number of years, please estimate.” The categories the respondent may choose are: 
number of years worked fulltime (more than 35 hours per week), number of years in part-time 
job with less than 12 hours per week, number of years in part-time work between 12 and 20 
hours per week, number of years in part-time work between 20 and 30 hours per week, 
number of years in part-time work between 30 and 35 hours per week. These data have been 
used to construct actual experience in full-time equivalents (expfteq in Table 2). Furthermore 
the questionnaire addresses the calendar year of first employment, the calendar year in which 
first exit from the labor market for at least one year, the calendar year of first re-entry after the 
first exit, the calendar years of last exit for more than one year and corresponding re-entry, 
and the calendar years of exit and re-entry of the longest period of non-employment if at least 
one year. These data have been used to construct actual experience in calendar years (expcal 
in Table 2 below). 
The relative small sample size of data used imposes an important restriction on analyses. We 
must conduct our analyses on mothers and childless women for a pool of all age categories 
although women from various birth cohorts would have different child bearing and 
11 
 
participation behaviour as argued in section 2. It may be expected that the existence and 
direction of sample selection bias can differ across birth cohorts. This restriction is partly 
relaxed by using three cohort dummies in regressions.  
 
Table 2 Variable definitions 
Variable Name Definition 
Dependent variables  
Employment decision 1 if works for pay, zero otherwise. 
Motherhood decision 1 if children11, zero otherwise 
Type of employment decision: Less 
demanding job decision 
1 if “clustered group variable” indicates less demanding job; 
zero otherwise. See for the definition of clustered group 
variable A 
 
Ln wage The natural log of hourly wage from current job in NLG of 
2001, excludes overtime pay, shift premium, bonus, 
commission, or allowances, but includes 8 per cent holiday 
premium in case such a premium is reported.12 
  
Explanatory variables  
Age, Age2 Age in years; Age squared 
Agecat1 1 if age>=20 and age<=36, zero otherwise  
Agecat2 1 if age>36 and age<=46, zero otherwise 
Agecat3 1 if age>46 and age<=64, zero otherwise 
Education Years of education (constructed from highest level 
completed (2: primary school, resp. 8: university)) 
Expcal  Years of employment experience in number of calendar 
years in which employed 
Expfteq Years of employment experience in fulltime full years 
equivalents 
Tenure Years worked for current employer 
Situ02 1 if working hours are between 20 and 35; zero otherwise 
Situ03 1 if working hours are less than 20, zero otherwise 
Permanent 1 if permanent contract and temp preceding permanent; zero 
otherwise 
Partner 1 if married/cohabiting, zero otherwise 
Durpartn Duration of current marital status in yrs. 
Partnernw         1 if partner works >=30 hours pw, zero otherwise (incl no 
partner) 
Paiddomhelp       1 if paid domestic help, zero otherwise 
Urbanisation Degree of urbanisation, 1 to 5; 1=highest, 5=lowest degree 
Maincities 1 if lives in the three major cities, zero otherwise 
Wishchild 1 if wish for (another) child in the next 3 years, zero 
otherwise 
Fem80 1 if 80% of employees in establishment are female, zero 
otherwise 
                                                     
11. We have information on children living at home, and therefore lack information on children living independently or with a 
divorced parent other than the mother. However we have information on whether women were not employed for more than one 
year for the reason of caring for children. The reason caring for children is separated from caring for the household. We assume 
these women to be mothers, which is very likely, in the Dutch situation. 
12 In order to compare wages, the wages have been converted into hourly rates based on the number of hours per week and 
corrected for the period covered by the payment, which is usually one month, but could be four weeks or one week. In case the 
reported contractual hours per week was zero or close to zero, the actual worked hours have been used for the calculations. 
Furthermore we exclude self-employed and freelancers.  
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Fsize10 1 if number of employees less or equal to 10; zero 
otherwise. 
Health_physical 1 if feels physically healthy; zero if not 
Health_mental 1 if feels mentally healthy; zero if not 
Volunteer13 1 if works as an unpaid volunteer, zero otherwise 
 
A Clustered group variable uses the information on the following variables:  
1. Hours 1 if <28 hrs pw, zero otherwise 
2. Temp 1 if temporary contract14, zero otherwise  
3. No-supjob 1 if not employed in managerial job, zero otherwise 
4. No-workhome 1 if not doing part of the job at home, zero otherwise  
5. No-crsjob 1 if not attended courses or training in the past year because 
job does not require courses or training.  
6. Fem80 1 if 80% of employees in establishment are female, zero 
otherwise 
7. No-job3yrs 1 if expects not (sure) to be employed three years from now, 
zero otherwise. 
8. No-ovtimewkly 1 if not working more than contractual hours on a weekly 
basis, zero otherwise  
9. Commuteless 1 if commuting time less than half an hour to work place 
(one way), zero otherwise 
Selection variables*  
11λ   (S1) Measures the possible selection bias from the employment 
(type of employment) decision for mothers 
12λ   (S1) Measures the possible selection bias from the motherhood 
decision for mothers 
21λ  (S2) Measures the possible selection bias from the employment 
(type of employment) decision for childless women  
22λ   (S2) Measures the possible selection bias from the motherhood 
decision for childless women 
31λ   (S3) Measures the possible selection bias from type of 
employment decision for mothers 
32λ  (S3) Measures the possible selection bias from the motherhood 
decision for mothers  
41λ  (S4) Measures the possible selection bias from type of 
employment decision for childless women 
42λ  (S4) Measures the possible selection bias from the motherhood 
decision for childless women 
* Corresponding selections as in Figure 3 between brackets. S3 and S4 are only considered in 
the type of employment and motherhood decisions as in Figure 3b. 
5 Determining less demanding jobs 
We are interested in whether mothers are more likely to be in a type of job that is to be 
considered as less demanding as compared with more demanding jobs. With this relative 
concept of a type of job we aim to create a job category that cover jobs providing less 
attractive opportunities for earnings and promotion, and requiring relatively less effort. Less 
demanding jobs are approximated by available information in our data on time spent at work, 
                                                     
13 An individual can be engaged in volunteer work on top of paid work, but not necessarily so. Volunteer work mostly involves 
sport clubs, churches, schools, care for elderly.  
14 This category excludes the temporary contracts that precede a permanent contract. In The Netherlands a person hired in a 
permanent position will dependent on negotiation between employer and employee, start with a temporary contract with a formal 
intention of changing the temporary contract into a permanent contract after one or two years. This period is different from the 
probation period of two months.  
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career effort and flexibility since there is no single indicator of less demanding jobs. Indeed, 
recent studies show that part-time jobs are paid similarly compared to full time jobs in the 
Dutch part-time economy.15 An immediate implication of this evidence is that less demanding 
jobs cannot be constructed solely in terms of wage rates and working hours.  
We distinguish between less demanding and other jobs by use of cluster analysis. The 
variables used are defined and reported in Table 2. Since all variables are binary, a simple 
Jaccard binary similarity index may be an appropriate measurement for less demanding jobs 
(Stata manual)16. This index, like many other indexes, is based on the four values from the 
cross tabulation of the two observations, i and j. 
    Obs. J 
  1 0 
1 a b Obs. i 0 c d 
 
Every cell represents the number of variables where observations i and j have a combination 
of one or zero values. Jaccard index is defined as 
a
a b c+ +  
which is the proportion of matches when at least one of the observations has a one. When 
both observations have a zero (cell d), this index is undefined. In this case, the index takes a 
one, which is a perfect match. 
Using this similarity index, we split up the aggregate sample of employed workers into two 
categories: those who have a demanding job and those who have a less demanding job. As a 
starting variable we use the dummy variable (part-time) that takes a one if women work less 
than 28 hours in a week, and takes a zero if they work more than 28 hours. This critical point 
of working hours is in effect not arbitrary. It is determined by a policy that facilities workers 
who work more than 28 hours with equal rights as full-time workers, in order to keep both 
women and men employed in long part time jobs. Upon part-time, the definition of less 
demanding jobs is extended by additional variables in a rank order from more to less 
important (numbers 2-8 in Table 2). These additional variables are intuitively chosen on the 
basis of their expected unambiguous negative effort on career prospects. Temporary jobs do 
not provide a stable labour market career and will not be desired by career oriented 
employees. Jobs without any supervisory tasks may also be less demanding than jobs with 
supervisory tasks. We have information from earlier studies (Peters et al 2002) that taking 
work home is associated with high level knowledge workers rather than unskilled manual 
workers in the Netherlands. These knowledge workers are rewarded on the basis of the 
quality of their work rather than on their presence at the work place during business hours.  
Therefore we classify workers who take work home for a part of their working week as 
having a demanding job, whereas those workers who do not take work home as having less 
demanding jobs. Jobs that require no additional courses or training are supposed to be routine 
jobs demanding no additional hours out of working time or no additional effort per hour 
during working time. Jobs in a female dominated environment are known as less promising 
jobs with respect to promotion and earnings profile. Expectations on employment continuity 
                                                     
15 67.6% of employed women working part-time i.e. less than 35 hours per week. Also with 
respect to parttime employment among men the Netherlands ranks 1 with 18 per cent 
(Gustafsson, Kenjoh and Wetzels, 2002). The effect of working part-time on hourly wages is 
small. However, the sign and significance are not unambiguous (see Gustafsson et al 2002; 
Wetzels 2002; Zorlu 2002: Dekker et al 2000). 
16 The choice of the Jaccard similarity index is arbitrary since there are many similarity measures. 
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given by no job in three years time is taken as an indication for a weak commitment to have a 
continuous labour market career. Similarly we interpret limiting the work effort by 
contractual hours and restricting commuting time as indications confirming less time and 
effort to work.  
Table 3 presents the summary of statistics for (less) demanding jobs resulting from the cluster 
analysis and used as a dependent variable in our analyses.  
 
Table 3: Type of employment: summary of statistics for (less) demanding jobs  
 Employment Less demanding 
jobs
Demanding jobs
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1. Hours 0.519 0.50 0.920 0.27 0 0
2. Temp 0.088 0.28 0.136 0.34 0.027 0.16
3. No-supjob 0.802 0.40 0.868 0.34 0.716 0.45
4. No-workhome 0.666 0.47 0.753 0.43 0.554 0.50
5. No-crsjob 0.163 0.37 0.272 0.45 0.023 0.15
6. Fem80 0.232 0.42 0.258 0.44 0.198 0.40
7. No-job3yrs 0.098 0.30 0.164 0.37 0.014 0.12
8. No-ovtimewkly 0.749 0.43 0.819 0.39 0.658 0.48
9. Commuteless 0.774 0.42 0.847 0.36 0.680 0.47
N 509 287 222 
  
Lnhrlywage 
N 
3.261
459
0.40 3.187
250
0.46 3.349 
209 
0.30
Data: Work&IT 2001, Variable definitions in Table 2. Mean parameter values for employment are 
equal to the weighted average of mean values for demanding and less demanding jobs. 
 
We expect more mothers in less demanding jobs because passive fathering styles are still the 
dominant pattern, childcare is highly rationed, and school hours do not fit fulltime career 
schedules or even long part time career schedules. Additionally, Dutch mothers are tended to 
put their children in paid childcare for a maximum of 3 days per week and to care for their 
own children for the rest of week. Therefore, more employed mothers will seek part-time jobs 
that require less commuting, with fixed hours of work, with possibilities to take leave easily 
for reasons of care in case of illness and other unexpected events. Furthermore, we expect 
more mothers in jobs that are less stressful since mothers may already experience more stress 
from their child-related responsibilities compared to childless women and men.  
6 Results and interpretation 
We estimate two double selection models separately. The first model describes a double 
selection process on motherhood and employment decisions which we assume to be taken 
simultaneously, and the second model concerns a simultaneous selection on the decisions on 
motherhood and employment in a less demanding job (as described in section 3). Our results 
from both models are presented in Table 4. 
6.1 Motherhood and employment decisions  
The left panel of Table 4 shows the estimated coefficients for the motherhood and 
employment decisions that are simultaneously estimated by bivariate probit model. The 
parameter vectors in the first and second equation are identified since at least one variable is 
included in one of the variable vectors (X or Z) but not in the other (Abowd and Farber 1982). 
The correlation between the disturbances of employment decision and motherhood decision in 
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the simultaneous bivariate probit model, given by (ρ), is significantly negative which implies 
that bivariate probit model provide efficient results in our estimations, and an estimation 
procedure relying on a binomial probit model would have left the sample selection problem 
unsolved. This negative rho indicates that mothers who are employed have more favorable 
characteristics than mothers who are not employed, and childless women (both in paid work 
and not in paid work), which is in line with human capital theory.  
Women from older birth cohorts have a significantly low probability of participation while 
they are more likely a mother, suggesting the decreasing fertility rate. The accumulation of 
human capital, represented by education and experience, has a positive effect on employment 
probability and a negative effect on motherhood confirming earlier studies (Blossfeld and 
Rower (1995), Gustafsson, Kenjoh and Wetzels 2002, Wetzels 2002). It is notable that the 
first effect is larger than the second in absolute terms, which suggests a relatively strong 
labour market orientation of well-educated women. Also women involved in voluntary work 
are more likely employed while physical health problems significantly lower the employment 
probability. The employment inclination of women is not affected by whether or not their 
partner is employed. It is obvious that the presence of partner has the largest impact on the 
probability of being mother. Living in residential areas with a low degree of urbanization 
increases the probability of being mother. This supports the assumption that people prefer to 
live or to move toward less urbanized residential areas when they have or want to have 
child(ren).17 
6.2 Motherhood and less demanding job decisions 
The simultaneous decisions for employment in a less demanding job and motherhood are 
estimated by bivariate probit model. The right panel of Table 4 presents the estimated 
coefficients of this double selection model. The estimated correlation between the 
disturbances of the two selection equations, rho, is highly significant and positive. This 
indicates that mothers are more likely employed in less demanding jobs compared to childless 
women18. Since a vast majority of mothers are employed in part-time jobs, mothers are more 
likely employed in a less demanding job than employed childless women.  
 
Table 4 Bivariate probit estimates: Motherhood and (type of) employment decisions 
Motherhood Decision  Motherhood decision 
 Coeff. T Coeff. t 
Agecat2 0.716 4.85 0.900 4.92 
Agecat3 0.426 2.42 0.751 2.56 
Partner 1.595 10.07 1.424 7.80 
Expcal -0.017 -2.47 -0.020 -1.77 
Yrseduc -0.077 -2.52 -0.095 -2.79 
Wish_Child -0.302 -1.57 -0.149 -0.80 
Urbanis. 0.178 3.98 0.148 2.91 
Constant -0.474 -0.93 -0.158 -0.27 
Employment Decision  Less Demanding Job Decision 
Agecat2 0.659 4.03 
Agecat3 0.713 3.18 
Expcal 0.051 6.01 -0.009 -0.99 
Yrseduc 0.212 6.22 -0.081 -2.46 
                                                     
17 see Murphy & O’Sullivan (1985) analysing this assumption in Britain, and Mulder and Wagner (2001) in The Netherlands and 
Germany. 
18 This correlation does not give any indication for which decision is made first. Whether mothers choose to work in less 
demanding jobs or whether women employed in less demanding jobs become mother are investigated in section 7. 
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Partnw 0.005 1.64 0.016 4.71 
Health_Phys -0.893 -6.18 0.047 0.22 
Volunteer  0.530 4.63 Paiddomhelp     -0.558 -3.45 
Constant -3.075 -5.21 0.712 1.23 
Rho -0.250 -2.81 0.509 7.68 
N 719 503  
Data: Work&IT 2001, Variable definitions in Table 2. 
 
The likelihood that older age cohorts (36-45 and 46-64) are mothers and employed in less 
demanding jobs is significantly larger compared to the women below 36 years. The relatively 
low coefficient for age cohort 46-64 in motherhood equation and a bigger coefficient in the 
less demanding job equation implies a low employment rate of women from this cohort and at 
the same time a high concentration in less demanding jobs. The estimated coefficients of 
motherhood model are similar to the coefficients in the earlier double selection model 
presented in section 6.1. Education decreases the likelihood of employment in less demanding 
jobs but experience and physical health have no effect on this likelihood. Also paid domestic 
help significantly lowers the likelihood of having a less demanding job. However, this 
relationship might be the other way around: women employed in less demanding jobs may 
have less frequently paid domestic help, which we do not verify here.  
6.3 Selectivity corrected wage regressions 
Wage equations for mothers and childless women are estimated separately twice: with and 
without the selection correction terms (lambda’s). The estimates are presented in Table 5. 
6.3.1 Wages of Mothers and childless women 
It is notable that the highest obtained level of education has a larger effect on mothers’ gross 
hourly wage than childless women’s, 6.3% versus 4%. Years of experience increases the 
wages of childless women by 3% at a decreasing rate but it has no effect on mothers’ wage 
which seems, instead, to be affected by tenure. No other explanatory variable is significant in 
the wage regression of childless women while some other variables are significant in the 
mothers’ wage regression.  Mothers who are employed in firms with less than 10 employees 
and who live in the three largest Dutch cities earn respectively 14.3% and 26.3% less hourly 
wages than other mothers. On the other hand, mother earn significantly higher wages (32.5%) 
when they have a permanent employment contract.  
The selectivity correction variables, which are our main interest, are not significant in the 
wage regression of childless women, as expected since these variables are based on 
underlying correlation between the disturbances of the employment and the motherhood 
decisions. However, first and second selectivity variables are significant at 10 and 5 percent 
levels respectively in mothers’ wage regressions.  
Table  5 Wage regressions by motherhood 
 Childless women Mothers Childless women Mothers 
 coeff t Coeff t coeff t coeff t
Yrseduc 0.040 3.20 0.063 4.55 0.046 3.90 0.064 4.49
Expcal 0.030 3.90 0.019 1.60 0.028 3.72 0.005 0.41
expcal2 -0.000 -2.76 -0.000 -0.73 -0.000 -2.55 0.000 0.12
Tenure 0.006 1.77 0.012 3.31 0.006 1.73 0.013 3.47
Health_phys 0.046 0.55 -0.067 -0.67 0.033 0.39 0.048 0.51
Fsize10 -0.016 -0.23 -0.143 -2.41 -0.011 -0.16 -0.127 -2.12
Health_mental 0.046 0.47 -0.103 -0.76 0.054 0.55 -0.099 -0.72
Maincities 0.021 0.39 -0.263 -2.29 0.047 0.90 -0.169 -1.52
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Parttime short -0.109 -1.23 -0.011 -0.22 -0.146 -1.70 -0.008 -0.16
Perm -0.031 -0.38 0.325 4.39 -0.018 -0.22 0.332 4.48
Fem80 -0.096 -1.57 -0.086 -1.62 -0.095 -1.54 -0.080 -1.48
Lambda21 0.014 0.27 0.072 1.81  
Lambda22 0.058 0.90 0.373 2.86  
Constant 2.404 8.68 1.752 5.47 2.281 8.68 1.965 6.19
Data: Work&IT 2001, Variable definitions in Table 2. 
 
6.3.2 Wages of Mothers and childless women in (less) demanding jobs 
The estimates of the wage equations for mothers and childless women who are employed in 
less demanding jobs or demanding jobs are presented in Table 6. Both selectivity correction 
terms are significantly positive for mothers in less demanding jobs while they are significant 
for childless women in demanding jobs (having different signs).  
It is notable that only the coefficient for permanent contract is significant at a 10 percent 
level, indicating a 35.4% lower wage rate relative to those who have a permanent contract. On 
the contrary, mothers earn 29.8% higher hourly wage if they have a permanent contract. Also 
tenure has a small positive effect on mothers’ wage. Mothers employed in small firms (less 
than 10 employees) have an 18.6% lower wage rate.   
Considering demanding jobs, return to education is similar for mothers and other women 
around 5% while experience has significant positive effect on the wages of childless women. 
Again mothers with a permanent contract earn substantially higher wages than mothers with a 
temporary contract, (46.2%) while having a mental health problem and living in the three 
largest cities drastically lower the hourly wages of mothers.  
 
Table  6 Wage regressions by type of employment and motherhood 
 Childless wo. Mothers Childless women Mothers
Less demanding job Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t
Yrseduc -0.027 -1.17 0.034 1.56 -0.009 -0.47 0.058 2.92
Expcal 0.050 1.60 0.005 0.25 0.042 1.37 -0.003 -0.14
expcal2 -0.001 -1.58 0.000 0.18 -0.001 -1.29 0.000 0.47
Tenure 0.007 0.93 0.015 3.63 0.006 0.64 0.016 3.86
health_phys 0.333 1.44 -0.034 -0.47 0.352 1.42 0.008 0.09
fsize10 -0.145 -0.72 -0.186 -2.48 -0.169 -0.84 -0.176 -2.29
health_mental 0.227 1.17 -0.083 -0.77 0.178 0.89 -0.101 -0.86
Maincities -0.048 -0.30 -0.203 -1.60 0.061 0.42 -0.132 -1.10
parttime_short -0.059 -0.33 0.019 0.36 -0.062 -0.35 0.021 0.38
perm -0.354 -1.93 0.298 2.27 -0.223 -1.23 0.305 2.38
Fem80 -0.214 -0.99 -0.095 -1.42 -0.217 -0.92 -0.097 -1.44
Lambda21 0.120 1.05 0.124 2.68  
Lambda22 0.014 0.21 0.364 2.17  
Constant 3.131 5.19 2.232 5.50 2.620 4.58 2.128 5.15
Demanding jobs   
Yrseduc 0.051 4.29 0.057 3.02 0.060 4.98 0.052 2.74
Expcal 0.026 3.13 0.022 1.55 0.023 2.76 0.020 1.48
expcal2 -0.000 -1.91 -0.000 -0.69 -0.000 -1.58 -0.000 -0.64
Tenure 0.002 0.68 0.000 0.04 0.002 0.70 -0.001 -0.12
health_phys -0.154 -1.82 0.017 0.13 -0.151 -1.60 0.057 0.41
fsize10 0.052 0.67 0.116 0.87 0.026 0.32 0.106 0.82
health_mental -0.068 -0.64 -0.416 -2.67 -0.053 -0.47 -0.420 -2.44
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maincities 0.036 0.67 -0.242 -4.08 0.012 0.23 -0.256 -4.54
Parttime_short -0.225 -3.67 -0.078 -0.45 -0.162 -3.14 -0.045 -0.26
Perm 0.019 0.15 0.462 3.28 0.039 0.30 0.454 3.00
fem80 -0.046 -0.90 -0.131 -1.25 -0.058 -1.15 -0.131 -1.29
Lambda41 0.287 3.54 0.017 1.00  
Lambda42 -0.169 -2.91 -0.079 -1.06  
Constant 2.612 7.72 2.172 4.25 2.379 6.80 2.316 4.57
Data: Work&IT 2001, Variable definitions in Table 2. 
 
6.4 Wage differentials 
Wage differentials between childless women and mothers are decomposed in two alternative 
ways using the standard Oaxaca & Blinder decomposition technique, given in equation 22. 
The first decomposition is based on wage regressions that are corrected for the selectivity 
from bivariate probit model for employment and motherhood decisions. Second 
decomposition is based on the wage regressions that are corrected for the selectivity from 
bivariate probit model for motherhood and type of employment decisions. In order to show 
the efficiency of correction for double selectivity, all decompositions are repeated using wage 
regressions without any correction.  
Note that including selection correction terms leads to large changes in all components of 
decomposition although absolute extend of wage differentials remain similar (see table 7). It 
is obvious that the discrimination component of decompositions is substantially larger when 
the selectivity correction terms are included in wage regressions compared to the 
decomposition without the correction. Most striking result is that the mothers in less 
demanding jobs earn 37 percent lower wages than childless women due to discrimination 
while mothers in demanding jobs earn, however, 20.5 percent higher wages than childless 
women. As the estimates of wage regressions are not corrected for sample selection, wage 
differentials due to discrimination is negligible for mothers employed in demanding jobs 
while in less demanding jobs mothers are disadvantaged by a 4 percent.  
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7 Conclusions 
It is evident that mothers earn lower wages than childless women. Academic debate focuses 
on the question to what extent wage differentials between childless women and mothers can 
be explained by strictly human capital depreciation due to timeout during childbearing and 
caring, and what other factors play a role in explaining this wage gap. This paper analyzes 
this wage gap correcting the sample selection bias arising from two alternative bivariate 
selection processes: motherhood and employment decisions, and motherhood and less 
demanding job decisions. It is shown that the motherhood decision is significantly correlated 
with the employment decision and the employment decision in less demanding jobs. 
Correcting the wage function for these underlying double selection processes provides more 
efficient results compared the estimates without correction for sample selection bias. 
Although the overall wage gap between mothers and childless women remains similar across 
both estimation strategies, the estimates based on selectivity corrected wage functions 
generates a significantly higher discrimination component of the wage gap. Our results 
suggest that estimation of the wage gap should take into account the selectivity bias arisen 
from double selection rules.  
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Appendix Table A1: Wage regressions: All Women 
 Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
Age  -0.006 -2.05 
Yrseduc 0.061 6.80 0.060 6.62 0.061 6.71 
Expcal 0.022 3.40 0.020 3.07 0.024 3.56 
Expcal2 -0.000 -2.40 -0.000 -1.94 -0.000 -1.84 
Tenure 0.013 4.94 0.010 3.82 0.010 3.89 
Health_phys  0.032 0.51 0.031 0.50 
Fsize10  -0.092 -2.04 -0.086 -1.90 
Health_mental  -0.022 -0.28 -0.016 -0.20 
Maincities  -0.014 -0.29 -0.017 -0.34 
Parttime_long  -0.006 -0.16 -0.024 -0.59 
Perm  0.215 4.08 0.199 3.76 
Fem80  -0.093 -2.29 -0.089 -2.20 
Kid -0.087 -2.36 -0.062 -1.64 -0.042 -1.04 
Constant 2.110 13.87 1.991 9.93 2.142 10.12 
R2 0.21 0.27 0.280  
Age 0.050 3.65 0.042 3.05   
Agesq -0.001 -3.54 -0.000 -2.85   
Yrseduc 0.058 6.42 0.056 6.17   
Tenure 0.017 7.03 0.014 5.63   
Health_phys  0.043 0.68   
Fsize10  -0.093 -2.05   
Health_mental  -0.034 -0.42   
Maincities  -0.001 -0.01   
Parttime_long  -0.002 -0.05   
Perm  0.204 3.80   
Fem80  -0.086 -2.11   
Kid -0.093 -2.50 -0.067 -1.76   
Constant 1.374 4.52 1.395 4.26   
R2 0.21 0.26   
Age  -0.006 -2.57 
Yrseduc 0.064 7.30 0.062 6.99 0.064 7.17 
Expfteq 0.032 4.75 0.028 4.17 0.034 4.79 
Expft2 -0.001 -2.74 -0.000 -2.19 -0.000 -2.38 
Tenure 0.009 3.69 0.007 2.87 0.008 3.25 
Health_phys  0.017 0.28 0.016 0.26 
Fsize10  -0.096 -2.18 -0.093 -2.12 
Health_mental  -0.029 -0.37 -0.020 -0.26 
Maincities  -0.005 -0.1 -0.004 -0.08 
Parttime_long  -0.007 -0.21 0.010 0.25 
Perm  0.194 3.74 0.178 3.43 
Fem80  -0.082 -2.07 -0.074 -1.87 
Kid -0.050 -1.40 -0.025 -0.67 -0.002 -0.04 
Constant 2.035 14.07 1.974 10.37 2.102 10.56 
R2 0.25 0.300 0.31  
Data: Work&IT 2001, Variable definitions in Table 2. 
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